



Full reference: Armstrong, S., McLaughlin, C., Moustafa, M, W. & Elamer, A.A., (2021) ‘Audit 
committee diversity and corporate scandals: Evidence from the UK’, International Journal of 
Accounting and Information Management, forthcoming. (Accepted 12 August 2021). 
 
Audit committee diversity and corporate scandals: Evidence from the UK 
 
Stephen Armstrong 
Strathclyde Business School, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, G1 1XQ, Scotland 
 
Craig McLaughlin 
Strathclyde Business School, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, G1 1XQ, Scotland 
Email: craig.mclaughlin@strath.ac.uk    
 
 
Maha W. Moustafa 
 
School of Computing, Electronics and Maths, Coventry University, UK; and 
Department of Applied Statistics & Insurance, Mansoura University, Egypt 
Email: ad5625@coventry.ac.uk  
 
 
Ahmed A. Elamer  
 
Brunel Business School, Brunel University London, Kingston Lane, Uxbridge, London, UB8 3PH 
UK; and 
Department of Accounting, Faculty of Commerce, Mansoura University, Mansoura, Egypt 









Corresponding author: Brunel Business School, Brunel University London, Kingston Lane, London UB8 3PH, UK, E-mail: 




Audit committee diversity and corporate scandals: Evidence from the UK 
 
Abstract 
Purpose –This paper empirically analyses specific characteristics of an audit committee that 
could be associated with the likelihood of corporate fraud/scandal/sanctions.  
Design/methodology/approach –The sample includes all firms that were investigated by the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) through the audit enforcement procedure from 2014 to 
2019, and two matched no-scandal firms. It uses logistic binary regression analysis to 
examine the hypotheses. 
Research findings– Results based on the logit regression suggest that audit member tenure 
and audit committee meeting frequency both have positive associations to the likelihood of 
corporate scandal. Complementing this result, we find negative but insignificant relationships 
among audit committee female chair, audit committee female members percentage, audit 
committee qualified accountants members, audit committee attendance, number of shares held 
by audit committee members, audit committee remuneration, board tenure and the likelihood 
of corporate scandal across the sample.  
Practical implications – The results should help regulatory policy-makers make decisions 
which could be crucial to future corporate governance. Additionally, these results should be 
useful to investors who use corporate governance as criteria for investment decisions. 
Originality/value – We extend, as well as contribute to the growing literature on audit 
committee and therefore wider corporate governance literature and provide originality in that 
it is the first, to our knowledge, to consider two characteristics (i.e., remuneration and gender) 
in a UK context of corporate scandal. Also, the results imply that the structure and diversity 
of audit committee affect corporate fraud/scandal/sanctions. 
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A series of high-profile scandals of past three decades beginning with Enron, to the 2008 
financial crisis, to recent cases such as Carillion, have led to a greater focus on corporate 
governance to protect shareholders with a specific focus on audit committee structure (El-
Dyasty & Elamer, 2020; Elamer et al., 2018, 2019a, 2020; Ghafran and O’Sullivan, 2017; 
Karim et al., 2013; Li & Song, 2018; Yu & Wang, 2018). This study seeks to understand further 
the impact and importance of the audit committee in preventing corporate scandals. Audit 
committees remain trusted as a vital tool in the UK Corporate Governance Code, which is yet 
to receive much focus in terms of audit committees and fraud/scandal/sanctions. Thus, in this 
study, we make an effort to bridge the gap in financial reporting quality literature by examining 
the relationship between audit committee diversity and structure and the likelihood of corporate 
fraud/scandal/sanctions.  
The Corporate Governance Code in the United Kingdom (“UK”) has gone through several long 
processes and improvements from its inception in 1992 to the current version seen today 
(Bufarwa et al., 2020; CGC, 2018; Elamer & Benyazid, 2018; Elmagrhi et al., 2017; Feng et 
al., 2020). Originally the code was developed from recommendations of the Cadbury 
Committee which took the view that greater corporate governance control mechanisms were 
needed such as subcommittees (e.g., audit committee) (Agyemang-Mintah & Schadewitz, 
2018, 2019; Albitar et al., 2020a,b; Karim et al., 2013; Li & Song, 2018; Yu & Wang, 2018). 
Further developments were then made after UK reports such as the Higgs report and Smith 
Committee in 2003, which made recommendations on the corporate governance process and 
audit committee oversight respectively. The last significant revisions to the code were made in 
2018, which was changed to consider The Green Paper Consultation and the Financial 
Reporting Council’s (“FRC”) culture report. These changes always look to protect the 




(AlHares et al., 2020; Alshbili & Elamer, 2019; Elamer et al., 2020b; Elmagrhi et al., 2018). 
Yet, over the past few decades, there has been a long list high profile corporate scandals with 
the most recent to this study being Thomas Cook. This research to a degree investigates the 
effectiveness of the current 2018 UK Corporate Governance Code in terms of the audit 
committee guidance. Recent corporate scandals have sparked debate over the usefulness of the 
current version the UK Corporate Governance Code of which a key area is the audit committee 
under ‘Audit, Risk and Internal Control’. One of the audit committee’s main duties is to ensure 
the protection of shareholder’s interests through overseeing the firm’s financial reporting. 
Thus, instances where the FRC see fit to announce public investigations of a firm it can be seen 
as a failure of the audit committee’s monitoring duties.  
It is crucial to investigate the audit committee structure and diversity for several important 
reasons. Firstly, many audit committee members suggest that lack of time is the principal 
challenge to strong governance because of handling speedily expanding tasks and workload 
demands (KPMG, 2013) driven by the current regulations and governance initiatives 
(AbdelFattah et al., 2020; CGC, 2018). Unintentional costs of these fresh responsibilities 
include sharp litigation and reputational risks, and, subsequently, members maybe 
unwillingness to participate on audit committees, thus minimise the pool of audit committee 
members and extra growing workload pressure (Linck et al.,2009; Sharma et al., 2020). 
Secondly, the audit committee is a board of directors subcommittee, and therefore, a member 
working on several boards may not inevitably work on those boards’ audit committees. Thirdly, 
diverse boards’ audit committees instruct more general, strategic, and performance-oriented 
experiences. Hence, diverse boards’ audit committees may mitigate the likelihood of corporate 
fraud/scandal/sanctions. 
This research contributes to a growing literature on audit committee and therefore wider 




and provides originality in that it is the first, to our knowledge, to consider two characteristics 
in a UK context of corporate scandal. These two characteristics are the most recent areas of 
audit committee research in remuneration and gender. Our distinctive dataset on earlier 
corporate fraud/scandal/sanctions allow us to explore the association between audit committee 
characteristics and the likelihood of corporate fraud/scandal/sanctions made in actual practice. 
Utilising these data, we find some audit committee characteristics attenuate the occurrence of 
corporate fraud/scandal/sanctions. We conduct our analyses using detected 
fraud/scandal/sanctions by FRC that happened in the financial reports during the period 2014 
to 2019. We find that audit member tenure and audit committee meeting frequency both have 
positive associations to the likelihood of corporate scandal. Complementing this result, we find 
negative but insignificant relationships among audit committee female chair, audit committee 
female members percentage, audit committee qualified accountants members percentage, audit 
committee attendance, number of shares held by audit committee members, audit committee 
remuneration, board tenure and the likelihood of corporate scandal across the sample.  
Also, by considering audit committee diversity and structure, we expand the current literature 
by offering evidence that boards’ audit committees members tenure and meeting frequency 
may indicate red flags to investors. Our results suggest that future research should consider 
audit committee diversity with the most often analysed audit committee structure.  In summary, 
these results imply that the structure and diversity of audit committee affect corporate 
fraud/scandal/sanctions. 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses previous literature and hypotheses development. 
Section 3 introduces the research method. We present the results and discussion in Section 4. 




2. Extant Literature and Hypotheses Development 
2.1. Audit committee gender diversity 
There is no current gender quota in the UK Corporate Governance Code 2018, but diversity is 
encouraged as it has many benefits (Gavious et al., 2012; Khatib et al., 2021; Velte, 2018). 
Females have been shown to be more likely to discuss difficult issues, more fiscally 
conservative, better monitors, less tolerant to opportunistic behaviours, and more risk-averse 
(Chen et al., 2016; Roden et al., 2016). It comes as no surprise that gender diversity is an area 
that is taking greater academic focus since the traits above are important in the boardroom, and 
on their sub-committees such as the audit committee. Gavious et al. (2012) argue females on 
the audit committee help mitigate aggressive accounting decisions through their significant 
earnings management findings which support the claim of females being more risk averse. 
Females have also theorised to be more ethical in their judgements and behaviours their male 
counterparts (Kaplan et al., 2009; Vermeir and Van Kenhove, 2007). Kaplan et al. (2009) found 
females are more likely to report fraudulent financial reporting, which in the context of this 
study should see the presence of females reduce the likelihood of FRC investigation.  
Parker et al. (2017) and Wilbanks et al. (2017) find a significant and positive relationship 
between female members and both the reporting of control problems and fraud risk monitoring 
in financial reporting, respectively. These suggest greater diversity contributes to increased 
reporting quality and management assessment, a view supported by Harjoto et al. (2015). 
Ittonen et al. (2010) similarly suggest that audit committees with female chairpersons reduce 
the inherent risk of a misstatement by improving the enhancing the financial reporting process. 
Contrary to this, Chen et al. (2016) and Abbott et al. (2012) argue that although greater female 
board representation has many benefits1, this is not driven by females on the audit committee. 
 
1 Chen et al (2016) argue it mitigates material weakness while Abbott et al (2012) argue females are much more 




Velte (2018) and Wilbanks et al. (2017) also find a positive relationship between the percentage 
of females on audit committees and auditors’ disclosures and readability of key audit matters, 
measured by the Flesch reading ease index at the 1% level. These studies suggest there are 
benefits to gender diversity on the audit committee and firms should seek for this. Finally, 
Thiruvadi and Huang (2011) find consistent evidence to show the presence of female directors 
on the audit committee constrains earnings management. However, Sun et al. (2011) find no 
significant association between female audit committee representation and earnings 
management. Therefore, this paper’s final hypotheses are: 
H1: Audit Committee female representation has a significant effect on the likelihood of 
corporate scandal. 
H2: Audit Committee Chair female representation has a significant effect on the likelihood of 
corporate scandal. 
2.2. Audit committee financial expertise  
The UK Corporate Governance Code 2018 sets provisions that on the establishment of the audit 
committee the board should be satisfied that at least one member has recent and relevant 
financial experience but has avoided any attempt at defining it and leaves it up to the company 
to decide (FRC, 2018). The FRC did consider changing this to one member with competence 
in accounting and/or auditing, however, after consulting the industry, this was decided against 
including in the 2016 version of the UK Corporate Governance Code (Ghafran and O’Sullivan, 
2017). SOX in America is stricter with accounting expertise and certain types of non-
accounting (finance and supervisory) expertise accepted (Abernathy et al., 2014). This has led 
to a great debate in academic literature with studies in both the broad definition and some that 
break the definition into specific parts to test whether it is currently too lenient. This is an 




other responsibilities may involve requiring a strong understanding of the accounting 
framework and in-depth knowledge to fulfil the role to the best of their ability.  
Abernathy et al. (2014) in their 2006-2008 sample study focussed solely on financial expertise 
on the audit committee and its relationship with financial reporting timeliness. They break 
down financial expertise to those with accounting financial expertise gained from education or 
experience in accounting, those with accounting financial expertise gained from being a Chief 
Financial Officer (“CFO”), and non-accounting financial expertise which is still accepted in 
some cases under SOX. They find that public accounting financial expertise is significantly 
and negatively associated with earnings announcement lag, audit report lag, and United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) late filings which are all important factors of 
financial reporting timeliness. They did, however, find no association for both CFO financial 
expert and non-accounting financial expert. This may be down to the varying backgrounds of 
CFO’s due to the variety of work within the role they not always possess the technical 
accounting knowledge concerning, for example, accounting policies or unusual transactions 
that would be expected those with accounting experience or qualifications. Abernathy et al. 
(2014) find the same results when tested specifically on the audit committee chair. In a similar 
study, Wu et al. (2016) find that timely going-concern modifications prior to failure are more 
likely when the audit committee has a financial expert, at the 1% level2. This timing is 
important as it is often evidence of audit failure and linked to corporate governance, most 
recently this happened with Thomas Cook. The only UK study so far to separate the financial 
expert definition to any extent, is Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2017). In their study, they find audit 
fees are lower when financial experts are from accounting as opposed to non-accounting 
backgrounds. This could be due to a lack of specific accounting knowledge, so non-accounting 
 
2 Wu et al. (2016) use the broad financial expert definition. This definition does not distinguish between 




finance experts push for more extensive audits for greater self-assurance than accounting 
experts. 
Appiah and Chizema (2017) and Owens-Jackson et al. (2009) find no significant relationship 
between having a financial expert on the audit committee and corporate insolvency or 
fraudulent financial reporting, respectively. Contrary to this, Farber (2005) finds that fraudulent 
firms tend to have fewer financial experts on their audit committee. This difference is 
particularly interesting as both Farber (2005) and Owens-Jackson et al. (2009) used sample 
firms from SEC filing records. Badolato et al. (2014) similarly study the relationship between 
financial expertise and accounting irregularities, a measure of severe earnings management. 
They find financial, accounting, and CFO based expertise all insignificant. They do, however, 
find supervisory experience (non-financial) when combined with seniority is negative and 
significant. This suggests non-financial experts are possibly better at identifying non-recurring 
accounting issues and have a greater influence of irregularity deterrence. Interestingly, Ghosh 
et al. (2010), and Sun et al. (2014) find no significant evidence to suggest the presence of 
financial experts, using broad and narrow definitions respectively, on the audit committee is 
associated with earnings management. This is an interesting revelation as it can be reasonably 
expected that financial competence would improve a committee’s ability to monitor earnings 
management by the board. 
Kelton and Yang (2008) and Mangena and Pike (2005) find a positive and significant 
relationship between audit committee financial expertise and corporate disclosure. 
Interestingly, Li et al. (2012) find no significant relationship between audit committee financial 
expertise and disclosure. Financial experts would be expected to have a greater understanding 
and therefore be able to ask more technical questions of management and challenge 
management where necessary, which should, in theory, enhance transparency, yet results are 




there is some evidence to suggest the benefits of the non-accountancy financial experts as well. 
The current loose definition may be an area the FRCs successor, the Audit, Reporting and 
Governance Authority assess again in the future as literature in this area develops.  
Therefore, the third and fourth hypotheses are: 
H3: Audit Committee professional accountancy qualifications have a significant effect on the 
likelihood of corporate scandal. 
H4: Audit Committee audit experience has a significant effect on the likelihood of corporate 
scandal. 
2.3. Audit Committee Member Tenure 
There are currently no provisions in the UK Corporate Governance Code 2018 around audit 
committee tenure, only that after nine years on the board non-executive directors could be 
deemed no longer independent. This link to tenure could be viewed in the same way as a key 
audit partner in that after a certain amount of time it can be argued there is a familiarity threat, 
and a fresh pair of eyes could help (Vafeas, 2003, 2005). On the other hand, longer tenures can 
be expected to build firm-specific knowledge and understand their financial reporting process 
and in a better position to fulfil their responsibilities (Liu and Sun, 2010).  
Badolato et al. (2014), Bedard et al. (2004), and Ghosh et al. (2010) find audit committee 
member tenure to be significantly and negatively associated with abnormal and discretionary 
accruals which suggest longer tenure is linked to constraining earnings management. In 
contrast, Ghosh et al. (2010) find that absolute discretionary accruals decrease by 0.1% of total 
assets for every additional year of audit committee tenure, all else equal. Badolato et al. (2014) 
treat longer tenure as status and seniority on the committee, and the worst frauds occur when 
senior board members successfully undermine the audit committee, such as Enron (Thompson, 




negatively related to earning management, suggesting on-the-job experience has positive 
monitoring effects. This may also be because a lack of seniority damages a member’s ability 
to scrutinise since senior members are less prone to group pressures and have greater assurance 
in asking challenging questions (Persons, 2008). This contradicts Sun et al. (2014) and Garven 
(2015) who find no relationship between tenure and earnings management.  
Owens-Jackson et al. (2009) find no significant evidence of a relationship between committee 
tenure and fraudulent financial reporting. This is complemented by Abernathy et al. (2014) 
who find evidence of a positive association between tenure and financial reporting quality with 
audit committee tenure negatively and significantly linked to audit report lag. This suggests 
that there are benefits to longevity and with greater understanding audit members can excel in 
their roles and responsibilities such as help deliver financial reporting quality. Contrary to this 
Sharma and Iselin (2012) find a positive and significant association between member tenure 
and financial misstatements, which could also suggest directors with longer tenure do not 
exercise independent judgement, a view supported by Kim et al. (2013). Therefore, the eighth 
hypothesis is: 
H5: Audit Committee member tenure has a significant effect on the likelihood of corporate 
scandal. 
2.4.  Audit committee independence 
The UK Corporate Governance Code 2018 requires that the audit committees should consist 
of independent non-executive directors, which is a legal requirement of SOX. The audit 
committee is the ultimate board-level overseer of the financial reporting process ensuring 
objectivity, honesty, and protecting the external auditor from any undue influences 
(Archambeault et al., 2008). It is reasonably possible that if the audit committee independence 




judgement that is expected of them. There is no clear definition of independence to go by in 
the UK Corporate Governance Code 2018, leaving it up to the board themselves to determine 
if each director is independent in character and judgement (Enriques, 2003). However, there 
are characteristics that could be considered to compromise independence, such as excessive 
compensation or shareholding in the company of audit committee members as these represent 
financial interests. Previous studies tend to treat it as no affiliation – not recently employed, no 
relatives within management, not a professional advisor to the firm (Agrawal and Chadha, 
2005; Carcello and Neal, 2000; Klein, 2002) – whilst one suggested it should be taken from an 
investor’s perspective, essentially independence in mind rather than form (Ferreira, 2008). 
Independence has been one of the most broadly studied characteristics of audit committees.  
Uzun et al. (2004) sample fraud firms against matched no fraud firms and find a higher degree 
of independence in the audit committee significantly reduces the likelihood of fraud. This 
confirms the view of Abbott et al. (2000) and Owens-Jackson et al. (2009) who find 
independence as a key driver in fraud. Owens-Jackson et al. (2009) also find that even when 
audit committees were fully independent the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting did 
not decrease below 28%, suggesting that although audit committees can help mitigate fraud, 
there are limitations to their influence and that responsibility ultimately falls on management 
rather than the committee. Independence, therefore, has an association effect rather than 
causation. Contrary to these, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) find that when audit committee 
independence is looked at in isolation, it is unrelated to the probability of restated earnings and 
only becomes significant if combined with financial expertise. Persons (2009) uses a similar 
method of fraud/no-fraud matching to investigate the likelihood of early disclosure3. Persons 
(2009) finds that audit committee independence is positively associated with early disclosure 
 




and therefore, more ethical financial reporting and being less likely to engage in fraudulent 
financial reporting.  
Further to this Carcello and Neal (2000) find that audit firms are less likely to issue modified 
going-concern reports to financially distressed clients whose audit committees lack 
independence, showing a hesitation if subsequent dismissal is implied by management. 
Carcello and Neal (2003) further develop this in their study of auditor dismissals following the 
issue of new modified going concern reports to show how audit committees and auditors can 
work together to enhance corporate governance4. Their significant findings are more 
independent audit committees are more effective in protecting external auditors from dismissal 
following new modified going concern reports and that the independent members experience 
a significant turnover rate post auditor dismissal. In a similar UK study, Wu et al. (2016) find 
that audit committee independence is positively associated with the likelihood of going concern 
modification prior to failure. The issuance of a clean report when it should have been a going 
concern is exactly the type of scenario that an auditor fears and leads to an investigation from 
the FRC, which damages the credibility of the accounting profession. In a similar UK study 
focussed on insolvency, Appiah and Chizema (2017) find audit committee independence 
negatively and significantly related to corporate insolvency. Using a sample of 692 publicly 
traded US firms, Klein (2002) finds a negative relationship between audit committee 
independence and abnormal accruals is discovered, suggesting that greater independence helps 
constrain earnings management and therefore enhances committee effectiveness as an overseer. 
In terms of disclosure Li et al. (2012) also finds no relationship between audit committee 
independence and disclosure.  
 





One proxy for independence mentioned above is excessive remuneration. Audit committee 
members who are paid excessive remuneration could have their independence compromised 
by the financial incentive since it creates an alignment between them and the hand that feeds 
them (Barrier, 2002). Another theory is that excessive compensation may be a symptom of 
cronyism between directors who believe future income depends on a bias (Magilke et al., 2009; 
Persons, 2012). This is shown by Habbash et al. (2013) whose study of FTSE 350 companies 
between 2006 and 2007 found a significantly positive relationship between average audit 
committee member remuneration and upwards earnings management in one of their models5. 
In another study, Persons (2012) finds no significant association between fraudulent financial 
reporting and cash remuneration. Campbell et al. (2015) offer some support of this where they 
find no significant relationship between audit committee remunerations and the likelihood of 
the firm beating analysts’ forecasts. 
On the other hand, it is important to consider that greater remuneration may motivate 
objectivity as the members are paid more fairly for their skills. Engel et al. (2010) argue this 
link through the positive relationship between cash remuneration and audit fee, their proxy for 
financial monitoring. Rickling and Sharma (2017) support this with evidence suggesting that 
as cash-based remuneration to audit committee members is not linked to firm performance, 
greater or even deemed excessive amounts do not motivate short-term focus or compromise 
their independence.  Together these suggest that cash remuneration increases objectivity and 
should help reduce the likelihood of corporate scandal, a view supported by Magilke et al. 
(2009). It is widely accepted by the authors above that literature in this area is scarce, which 
creates an opportunity for greater review. Therefore, the first hypothesis is: 
 
5 Habbash et al (2013) is a paper that distinguishes between upwards and downwards earnings management. 
Upwards being more likely to adjust figures upwards to portray better performance while downwards would 




H6: Audit Committee remuneration has a significant effect on the likelihood of corporate 
scandal. 
2.5. Audit committee share ownership 
A subset of independence is audit committee share ownership in the firm. Significant share 
ownership could compromise the independence of the member(s) who would then have a 
financial interest in the firm. There is also an argument through agency theory that significant 
share ownership makes audit committee members more likely better to perform their duties in 
the interests of shareholders because their interests would be aligned (Ghosh et al., 2010). 
Interestingly, Garven (2015) and Ghosh et al. (2010) find no evidence to suggest the audit 
committee share ownership, at any level, is associated with earnings management. Contrary to 
this, Sun et al. (2014) find that block shareholding by audit committee members are 
significantly and negatively related to real earnings management6. To add further ambiguity, 
Yang and Krishnan (2005) find share ownership by audit committee members to be negatively 
associated with earnings management. All three studies were carried out in the US and follow 
similar methods, so the difference in results is surprising. Klein (2002) provides some support 
to Sun et al. (2014) as with the finding that outside directors7 with block shareholdings are 
more effective at constraining accrual earnings management in US firms. Further to this, Li et 
al. (2012) in a 2005 UK study of 100 London Stock Exchange companies in intellectual capital-
intensive sectors find audit committee member shareholding to be negatively and significantly 
associated with disclosure at a 5% level. Mangena and Pike (2005) support this as they 
similarly find the level of disclosure decreases with the amount of share ownership held by 
audit committee members in their sample of 262 UK listed firms. Transparency is at the top of 
shareholder priorities, and these two studies together create the perception that when audit 
 
6 Real earnings management being the manipulation of cash flows measure by abnormal discretionary 
expenses, production costs, and cash flows from operations 




committee share ownership is high, their independence and criticalness of management is 
compromised, an agency theory issue. A possible reason for this is negative disclosure can 
adversely affect company value. Carcello and Neal (2003) found that as share ownership of 
audit committee members increased, and they were less likely to protect auditors following 
unfavourable report issuance, suggesting their independence diminishes as their ownership 
stake grows. In terms of a board, shareholding is normally used to align management interests 
with that of shareholders for more positive outcomes and reduce agency costs. So, surprisingly, 
current studies seem to show audit committee member shareholdings to have adverse effects.  
Audit committee independence is by no means the likely causation of any one of these, but it 
is an important factor associated with many of them. Therefore, the second hypothesis is: 
H7: Audit Committee share ownership has a significant effect on the likelihood of corporate 
scandal. 
2.6. Audit committee size 
The UK Corporate Governance Code 2018 provisions set out that on the establishment of an 
audit committee, there should be no fewer than three independent board members, or for 
smaller firms 2 (FRC, 2018). The size of the audit committee is important as more members 
should, in theory, increase the diversity of gender, ethnicity, and with that skills, views, 
experiences and expertise on the committee (Madi et al., 2014). This should then be combined 
with greater resources available, particularly time, to fulfil the roles and responsibilities to the 
level expected.  
Wilbanks et al. (2017) and Sharma and Iselin (2012) find that audit committee size is 
significantly and positively associated with enhanced risk monitoring of fraud in financial 
reporting. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) and Appiah and Chizema (2017) however found 




insolvency. Further to this, Hoitash et al. (2009) find audit committee size is not significantly 
related to material weakness, a view supported by Farber (2005) and Huang and Thiruvadi 
(2010) who find it has no relation to the likelihood of SEC sanctions/fraud. It would be thought 
that these would have similar results since fraudulent financial reporting in many instances 
leads to corporate insolvency as can be seen with the ongoing liquidation of Patisserie Valerie. 
It is possible that the differences are down to different regulatory landscapes of the US and the 
UK setting where the latter has a greater degree of flexibility in their liberal principles-based 
approach (Habbash et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2016). 
Ghosh et al. (2010), Liu and Sun (2010) and Yang and Krishnan (2005) find a significant and 
negative relationship between audit committee size and earnings management and therefore 
poorer quality of financial reporting. This is supported by MacGregor (2012), who says larger 
audit committees are more effective at rejecting aggressive policies designed to meet earnings 
thresholds. This suggests that larger audit committee boards are more effective at constraining 
earnings management, which could be due to a higher likelihood of directors possessing the 
relevant accounting knowledge and experience. Garven (2015), He and Yang (2014), and Sun 
et al. (2014) provide conflicting evidence as they find no relationship between audit committee 
size and earnings management.  
Li et al. (2012) and Persons (2008) find that audit committee size is significantly and positively 
associated with disclosure at the level of 5% and 1% level, respectively. This contradicts the 
evidence of Mangena and Pike (2005) who found no relationship between audit committee size 
and the level of company disclosure. Although there is conflicting evidence, it may be that 
larger audit committees have a greater number of highly ethical members who combine to 
challenge the board when necessary. Therefore, the fifth hypothesis is: 




2.7. Audit committee activity 
The FRC has guidance on audit committees that recommends they meet no fewer than 3 times 
per financial year (FRC, 2016a). The frequency of meetings by the audit committee is a 
measure of diligence from the members as it should be accompanied by important prior 
research, so the meetings generate the necessary discussions and raise any important questions 
to go to the board. The meeting quality is largely dependent on the chair as they are charged 
with providing pre-meeting material, setting the agenda, controlling the discussions and 
helping develop member relationships, they are the nexus of the committee (Abernathy et al., 
2014; Beasley et al., 2009). Activity to a degree goes together with size as they share a 
significant positive relationship (Al-Najjar, 2011). They suggest this may be down to greater 
resources, and more members create a higher demand to discuss any potential monitoring 
points as they arise. 
Abbott et al. (2000), Farber (2005), and Owens-Jackson et al. (2009) report that the frequency 
of meetings has a negative and significant link to the likelihood of financial fraud. This is 
supported by Abernathy et al. (2014) who find audit committee meeting frequency to be 
negatively associated with earnings announcement lag and SEC late filings, two factors of 
financial reporting timeliness. These results may be because the ultimate goal of an audit 
committee is to protect shareholder interests in relation to financial reporting and internal 
control. The goal is more likely to be accomplished if members have greater opportunities to 
express their judgement (Madi et al., 2014). Most surprisingly Abbott et al. (2004) later 
contradict their earlier study where they fail to document any statistical significance between 
audit committee meeting frequency and the incidence of fraud, a view supported by Huang and 
Thiruvadi (2010) and Uzun et al. (2004). Ghosh et al. (2010) find that audit committee meeting 
frequency is negatively related to discretionary accruals which suggest audit committees are 




(2009), Naiker and Sharma (2009), and Zhang et al. (2007) who find firms with material 
weaknesses and internal control deficiencies hold more audit committee meetings8. This is 
supported by Sharma and Iselin (2012) who find a positive and significant relationship between 
meeting frequency and the likelihood of financial misstatement. Interestingly Bedard et al. 
(2004) and Yang and Krishnan (2005) find no significance between audit committee meeting 
frequency and earnings management.  
Kelton and Yang (2008), Li et al. (2012), and Persons (2008) all find a positive relationship 
between audit committee meeting frequency and disclosures. This suggests audit committees 
that meet more often tend to be more diligent and likely to request more transparency, an 
important factor for shareholders and management’s primary communication to them 
(McGrane, 2009). Persons (2008) has the extra benefit of testing fraud and non-fraud firms, 
which therefore links audit committees which meet more often to be less prone to fraudulent 
financial reporting. Further to this, Appiah and Chizema (2017) find meeting frequency to be 
negatively and significantly related to corporate insolvency. The literature around audit 
committee meeting frequency is largely encouraging towards more meetings as it allows the 
committee to exercise greater professional care which should, in turn, improve audit and 
financial reporting quality and reduce the likelihood of corporate scandal.  
Therefore, the sixth and seventh hypotheses are: 
H9: Audit Committee meeting frequency has a significant effect on the likelihood of corporate 
scandal. 
H10: Audit Committee meeting attendance has a significant effect on the likelihood of corporate 
scandal. 
 




2.8. Audit committee other directorships 
There is, currently, no guidance on a maximum number of other directorships anyone audit 
committee member can hold. However, an important attribute of an effective committee is each 
member has sufficient time to fulfil their role (Song and Windram, 2004). These roles come 
with significant time commitments which grows more demanding with each additional 
directorship. For example, Harrast and Mason-Olsen (2007) study of 500 audit committee 
members found that on average, 81.9% spent over 50 hours per financial year on each 
committee and 43.1% spent over 100 hours. Rupley et al. (2011) support this as they conducted 
the same study with a different sample and found similar results in that 45.2% spent over 100 
hours on the committee. Sharma and Iselin (2012) find a significant positive association 
between financial misstatements and audit committee members with high multiple 
directorships. These results supported by Song and Windram (2004) who say multiple 
directorships could undermine the audit committee’s effectiveness, which creates an argument 
that time split too thinly across many committees could have an adverse impact on the 
committee as a whole. There may be a ceiling to this though as sitting on several audit 
committees should provide members with additional experiences from different scenarios and 
how other experienced directors tackle them. These important learning experiences could help 
develop and improve their own monitoring abilities. Krishnan (2005), however, found no 
significance between outside directorships and the incidence of internal control problems.  
Sun et al. (2014) find a significant and negative association between audit committee members 
holding outside directorships and constraining earnings management. This is supported by 
Garven (2015) who find a significant and positive association between outside directorships 
and the occurrence of real earnings management, suggesting an excessively demanding 




Yang and Krishnan (2005) and Bedard et al. (2004) find a significant and negative relationship 
between outside directorships and earnings management. Therefore, the ninth hypothesis is: 
H11: Audit Committee outside directorships have a significant effect on the likelihood of 
corporate scandal. 
3. Research Method 
The method for this study is an empirical piece using quantitative logistic binary regression 
which runs independent variables against a dependent variable identified through binary use of 
1 or 0, in this case, corporate scandal firms. This largely follows the work of Owens-Jackson 
et al. (2009) and Uzun et al. (2004) who conduct similar studies in the US. To conduct this 
investigation, all companies from the FRC current and recently passed cases for the Audit 
Enforcement Procedure (‘AEP’) were used to avoid selection bias. Only cases where the 
investigation year was 2014 or later and involved Public Limited Companies (“PLC”) qualified 
as they follow the same UK Corporate Governance Code and are within the two most recent 
versions of the code that had significant changes. Two were subsequently removed from the 
population of thirteen; one due to lack of available information, whilst another had no 
comparable company on the database used to find comparable companies fairly, this left a 
sample of eleven9 with 22 firm-year observations. This small sample can be justified by similar 
studies such as Peasnell et al. (2001). They investigated a matched-pairs sample of 47 
companies sanctioned by the Financial Reporting Review Panel (“FRRP”) for defective 
statements over a greater period than this paper. A second study conducted by Song and 
Windram (2004) also used a matched-pairs sample of 27 firms who had adverse FRRP rulings 
between 1991-2000. It is, however, acknowledged that a larger sample would have allowed for 
more robust results.  
 




This paper follows a similar selection process to Owens-Jackson et al. (2009) who used SEC 
files on accounting and auditing enforcement releases, while Uzun et al. (2004) used white-
collar crime and fraud listings from The Wall Street Journal. The companies in each study were 
then time-matched to similar companies based on factors such as industry, size, and the 
exchange they are listed on. This paper used the S&P Capital IQ database as an unbiased 
method of matching companies which allowed similar companies based on industry and size10  
to be identified, from here the first two companies on the same exchange, or similar were 
selected. In the one instance where a second comparable company on the same exchange could 
not be found, e.g. Alternative Investment Market firm could not be matched, and then a London 
Stock Exchange counterpart was used which follows closely to Owens-Jackson et al. (2009). 
This paper has matched the AEP firms to two comparable non-scandal companies in an attempt 
to produce more comprehensive results. This results in 22 firms with 44 firm-year observations. 
Finally, the ‘event year’ which is the year the investigation is concerned with and the previous 
year was used as this will help highlight what leads to scandal.  
3.1 Research Model Specification  
To investigate whether audit committee diversity and structure influence the likelihood of 
corporate scandal in the UK, we employed a logistic binary regression model to test the 
hypotheses developed in Section 2. Given the type of data, the logistic binary regression model 
employed is specified below: 
Scandal 𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1ACFC𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2ACF𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3ACQ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5ACA𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6ACS𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7ACD𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8BIG4𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9ACE𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10ACSZ𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11ACR𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽12ACT𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                       (1) 
 




Consistent with the likelihood of corporate scandal studies (Owens-Jackson et al., 2009; Uzun 
et al., 2004), the dependent variable in Model 1, Scandal, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
AEP firms and 0 otherwise. Twelve audit committee characteristics were chosen for 
consideration based on previous literature and Owens-Jackson et al. (2009). From here, eleven 
independent variables were chosen for comparison after one was removed due to 
multicollinearity. The eleven independent variables and one control variable can be viewed in 
Table 1, along with a description of each. Audit committee chair as female (ACFC) and 
percentage of females on the audit committee (ACF) was chosen to expand on the recent 
debates around gender diversity on the audit committee, which is a new contribution from this 
paper that was not included in previous literature of this type, to our knowledge. A qualified 
accountant (ACQ) and audit experience (practice) (ACE) were used as a proxy for financial 
experience, which has been commonly broken down this way and tested in other empirical 
research papers such as Abernathy et al. (2014) and Badolato et al. (2014). The average number 
of audit committee meetings (ACM) and percentage of attendance (ACA) is used to illustrate 
the activity of the audit committee; however, there is a limitation here in that the length of each 
meeting and nature of them is unknown, it is possible that many meetings lacked substance. 
The average audit committee size (ACSZ) represents the resources available to the committee 
in terms of knowledge, time and personnel, and to a degree goes together with activity as they 
share a significant relationship (Al-Najjar, 2011). Independence is now quite conclusively 
studied and recognised to be positive. Therefore, this paper looks at factors which could 
compromise that independence, such as the average percentage of shares held by audit 
committee members (ACS). This was used in conjunction with average audit committee 
member compensation (ACR) as this could be viewed as an agency threat. The average number 
of outside directorships (ACD) was used as audit committee time requirements are ever more 




thinly or possibly increasing their experience. The average audit committee tenure (ACT) is a 
commonly explored variable as it can be closely linked to independence in aspect to familiarity 
and agency. It can also be linked to experience since, over time, firm-specific knowledge can 
be built. Externally audited by Big Four (BIG4) is a control variable used similarly by Owens-
Jackson et al. (2009), audit fee was another original control variable that was subsequently 
removed due to multicollinearity. This has resulted in hypothesis one through eleven looking 
at the significance of each on the likelihood of corporate scandal. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics across the whole sample along with a breakdown of 
scandal (AEP) and no scandal firm statistics. 
Table 2 presents some differences between the scandal and no scandal firms. It can be seen that 
scandal firms audit committees tend to be smaller, hold more meetings, have less gender 
diversity and are audited less by Big Four firms: 64% to no scandals 96%. This would make it 
appear there is possibly be a resource issue in fraud firms, such as a link between size and 
diversity. As for their audit committee members, scandal firms tend to have less qualified 
accountants, which could also be linked to size, as well as greater outside directorships, receive 
a greater commission, hold greater shareholdings, and serve on the audit committee longer. 
Since scandal firms have greater shareholdings and longer tenures, it could be argued this is an 
agency threat in scandal firms. There was little difference in audit experience between scandal 
and no scandal at 16.36% and 15.83% respectively, which is surprising considering the 
difference in accountancy qualifications, as well as scandal firms having less qualified 




at guidance set out in the UK Corporate Governance Code 2018, both scandal and no scandal 
audit committees meet in excess of the recommended 3 meetings at 4.5 and 4.07, respectively. 
Furthermore, both scandal and no scandal audit committees are bigger than the recommended 
3 members at 3.96 and 4.16 members, respectively. It can also be seen from the qualified 
accountant stats firms in both samples generally have 1 qualified accountant, which would be 
higher if this study had also included financial and supervisory qualified members to be 
counted. Overall, these figures are interesting because they suggest that both sets of firms, in 
terms of their audit committees, were on average compliant with the guidance of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code 2018 which opens up a debate as to whether the guidance is too 
loose. 
Looking at the combined statistics of the whole sample compared to other UK studies average 
female audit committee membership of 30.69% is in line with Velte (2018), whose sample had 
an average of 24%. These averages show a lack of diversity at the audit committee level. The 
audit committees in this sample were slightly larger and held slightly more meetings than some 
other UK studies (Ghafran and O’Sullivan, 2017; Li et al., 2012). Average audit committee 
accounting qualification is slightly lower than Beattie et al. (2012), but the mean former 
auditors is very similar at 0.65 members compared to their 0.6 members. The average 
shareholding of the sample (0.4%) is lower than Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2017) average of 
1.6%; interestingly, this is higher than this paper’s fraud sample too. The average outside 
directorships in this sample of 2.41 is significantly higher than Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2017) 
average of 0.35. Each variable had 66 observations. The sample on average complied with the 
UK Corporate Governance Code 2018. 




The final correlations for variables used in the regression can be observed in Table 3. The 
highest correlation, 0.68, is observed between audit committee meeting frequency and audit 
committee compensation. The only other correlation above 0.5 is the correlation between a 
qualified accountant and audit experience at 0.62, which intuitively makes sense. These values 
are similar to previous studies such as Badolato et al. (2014) who had correlations of 0.654 and 
0.633, whilst Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2017) had a correlation of 0.765 which shows these are 
a generally acceptable amount. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
4.2 Regression Results 
4.2.1 Audit committee gender diversity 
We examine whether more gender diversity on the audit committee is associated with the 
corporate scandal. The evidence is that across the board, females are underrepresented and 
there should be greater diversity since the average female representation being 30.7% with 
some committees in both AEP and non-AEP firms have no representation. There is 
approximately as many qualified accountants on a committee as females, an alarming 
comparison. In terms of regression results, this was looked at by female representation (H1) 
and female chairperson representation (H2) since this is the most senior and influential role on 
the committee. The results of the regression were that both hypotheses were rejected as both 
were found to be insignificant at 0.815 and 0.751, respectively. The results are consistent with 
the findings of Chen et al. (2016) and Abbott et al. (2012) in that it is agreed that although there 
are benefits to females on the board, these benefits are not driven by audit committee 
representation. Sun et al. (2011) were also unable to identify an association between female 
audit representation and earnings management. It is possible that similarly to accountancy 
qualifications, the lack of representation among both samples means the benefits are being 




more risk-averse should have clear benefits, but unfortunately, these have yet to be realised in 
this context. However, Thiruvadi and Huang (2011) found female presence constrains earnings 
management, while Ittonen et al. (2010) results suggest a female chairperson reduces the risk 
of misstatement, common factors that lead to scandal. A reason for these differences could be 
the size of the firms in this paper’s sample. To fall under the score of AEP and therefore, this 
sample, a firm must be a public interest entity or AIM-listed with a market capitalisation of 
over €200 million. This is important as larger firms tend to have significantly higher female 
representation on their audit committees as core members (Wilson, 2010; Zhu et al., 2010). 
Therefore, based on this, it comes as less of a surprise that it was not a significant factor. 
Although there is greater female representation in larger firms, females are still 
underrepresented, and this should be an area of considerable focus, there is greater diversity, it 
could prove to be a significant factor. This paper recommends that future versions of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code keep encouraging gender diversity and do more to highlight the 
benefits of it. It is not recommended that there is any forced requirement as that would be 
discriminatory towards other gender(s). 
4.2.2 Audit committee financial expertise 
It is recommended in the UK Corporate Governance Code 2018 that all audit committees 
should have at least one financially competent committee member. As the sample companies 
all follow the same code, it makes sense that it was unlikely the vague and generalised financial 
experience requirement would yield any significant results. For this reason, two commonly 
examined categories of financial expertise were used in accountancy qualifications (H3) and 
previous audit experience (H3). The results were that both were found to be insignificant at 
p=0.351 and p=0.318 respectively, and therefore, both are rejected, which is surprising. 
Intuitively it could be expected that these skills and experience would mitigate the likelihood 




and audit experience on the committee to understand complex financial issues, these are not 
associated with the likelihood of FRC investigation. There is potential that an association with 
FRC investigations comes from supervisory expertise or general financial expertise. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the coefficient for accounting experience was negative (-
3.17) which is evidence it could have a mitigating association, but the average percentage of 
members with accountancy qualifications is 29.1% and only 16% for audit experience. 
Therefore, it is possible that without a majority with such skills, decisions are taken out of their 
hands by majority rule.  
These results are comparable to Appiah and Chizema (2017) and Owens-Jackson et al. (2009) 
who finds no significant relationship between having a financial expert on the audit committee 
and corporate insolvency or fraudulent financial reporting respectively. These results differ 
from Farber (2005) who find fraudulent firms tend to have fewer financial experts on their 
audit committee, a feature of this study as well in terms of accounting experience. Naiker and 
Sharma (2009) also find evidence as their findings suggest audit experience on the audit 
committee is associated with greater monitoring of internal controls and financial reporting. 
Greater monitoring of internal controls does not always translate into less likelihood of 
investigation since many of the actions that lead to sanctions are the result of management 
overrides. This study is limited in that it has not looked at two other areas of financial expertise; 
financial and supervisory, which can also be used to satisfy the 2018 UK Corporate Governance 
Code recommendation and could be studied in the future. The two chosen variables were 
specifically chosen due to previous literature and that they are a requirement of audit 
committees for financial services firms under the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA, 2020). 
Based on the results the UK Corporate Governance Code should consider following the 
requirements of the Financial Conduct Authority, however, this is not regarded as an urgent 




4.2.3 Audit committee member tenure 
The other significant independent variable identified by this paper was the average tenure of 
audit committee members. Audit Committee average tenure was the most significant variable 
(p= 0.021) of the regression and had a positive relationship with the likelihood of corporate 
scandal; therefore, H4 is accepted. This could be due to entrenchment that reduces 
effectiveness, or they defend policies that they supported in the past that are possibly not as 
applicable due to the rapidly changing business environment. As the changing business 
environment becomes more challenging, it may become increasingly more difficult for longer-
tenured directors to keep ahead of changes to regulations and techniques that new members 
who bring fresh ideas to the committee could tackle. This result could also be linked to 
independence and suggest that the monitoring benefits of on-the-job experience are cancelled 
out by a familiarity threat. This threat is that over time longer-tenured members build friendly 
relationships with management that allows for undue influence in exercising independent 
judgement and having greater leniency with management. There is also the potential that with 
longer tenure it can be expected that members are to be more senior and in the latter part of 
their non-executive director career, which could come with greater risk appetite and less 
concern for reputation damage (Srinivasan, 2005). This evidence is again consistent with Kim 
et al. (2013) and Sharma and Iselin (2012) who find a positive and significant association 
between average audit committee member tenure and financial reporting violations and 
misstatements respectively.  
Further to this Ghosh et al. (2010) and He and Yang (2014) find a significant and positive 
relationship between average tenure and earnings management, which supports calls for a 
restrictive limit on director tenure (Sharma and Iselin, 2012). This comes from a logical 




partner11  independence and what is considered optimal for the audit committee that oversees 
them. The key audit partner is required to rotate every 5 years due by the FRC due to fear of 
their independence being compromised, so an independent audit committee should require the 
same (FRC, 2016b). This point is important as the average tenure among AEP firms was in 
excess of this at 5.7 years with some as members tenure as high as 11 years, making a strong 
case for these committees losing their independence and therefore damaging their objectivity 
and monitoring ability. For comparison, Non-AEP firm’s average tenures were comfortably 
within this at 3.79 years, so this is possibly an area of future study. There is some contradicting 
empirical literature in this area, as Owens-Jackson et al. (2009) find no significant relationship 
between committee tenure and fraudulent financial reporting. While Yang and Krishnan (2005) 
find tenure to be negatively related to earnings management which would suggest the 
experience has positive effects, however Garven (2015) and Sun et al. (2014) find no 
relationship for the same metric. The differences in results between this paper and Owens-
Jackson et al. (2009) may be down to the difference US and UKs litigation landscapes, which 
arguably in the US keep members more in line. This paper calls for consistency by regulators 
in what is necessary for maintaining independence, as the current differing requirements 
between independent key audit partners and audit committee members in nonsensical.  
4.2.4 Audit committee independence 
Audit committee independence is now largely a requirement in most developed corporate 
government systems now. It has been widely studied and the positive impacts of the characters 
are well documented. For this reason, this paper looked at factors which could compromise 
audit committee independence, such as excessive audit committee remuneration and excessive 
audit committee share ownership. Based on the results, both hypotheses are rejected as their p-
values of 0.422 and 0.646 show they are insignificant and are not associated with the likelihood 
 




of corporate scandal. These results suggest that in this study independence is not breached to a 
problematic extent by remuneration or share ownership but that it also has little enhancing 
benefits either. The result is supported by Persons (2012) as they find no significant association 
between fraudulent financial reporting and cash remuneration levels.  
4.2.5 Audit committee share ownership 
The lack of significance in share ownership is likely down to low shareholdings on average 
across both AEP and non-AEP firms because the coefficient is highly positive (34.12) which 
would suggest at higher levels this may be detrimental. This is supportive evidence that at 
higher levels of shareholding, a member’s independence could be compromised due to their 
financial interest in the firm. There is weak support for this result by Garven (2015) and Ghosh 
et al. (2010) who find no evidence to suggest audit committee share ownership is associated 
with earnings management. This is weak evidence as aggressive earnings management can 
commonly lead to sanctions, for example, Carillion (one of the sample companies). There are 
many other ways, however, that companies may find themselves under investigation by a 
regulator. 
Contrary to this finding, Uzun et al. (2004) find that a higher degree of independence in the 
audit committee significantly reduces the likelihood of fraud. Their paper analysed member 
relationships with management as well as some other factors to determine the degree of 
independence. This is likely why share ownership had such a high coefficient as it is a factor 
in determining the degree of independence of an audit committee. Abbott et al. (2000) and 
Owens-Jackson et al. (2009) also find independence to be a key driver. It is important to note 




ownership12. It may be a limitation of this study that all independence factors could not be 
considered. Based on the findings above this paper does not recommend any restrictions or a 
cap on audit committee member remuneration as long as it is not tied to performance. Further 
to this, the highly positive coefficient of shareholding percentage would suggest that the 
regulator should consider a limit on member equity holdings of the firm since the maximum 
held was 12.94% in this sample.  
4.2.6 Audit committee size 
The provision for size in the UK Corporate Governance Code 2018 is that it must be satisfied 
with at least 3 members, or in smaller companies 213. In analysing this variable, it helps 
regulators understand both if the minimum is the right amount and if too little or too many 
members is associated with the likelihood of FRC investigation. The result of the regression 
analysis is that size is not significant and H8 is, therefore, rejected at a p-value of 0.594. This 
is consistent with Farber (2005) who found audit committee size to have no significance in the 
likelihood of SEC sanctions, while other studies complement this view as well (Agrawal and 
Chadha., 2005; Appiah and Chizema, 2017; Hoitash et al., 2009). Wilbanks et al. (2017) and 
Sharma and Iselin (2012) however find that audit committee size is significant and positively 
associated to enhanced risk monitoring of fraud. The characteristic is likely insignificant 
because on average, both AEP and non-AEP firms were more than the UK requirement at 3.95 
and 4.15 members, respectively. Therefore, it could be that the minimum requirement helps 
reduce the likelihood of corporate scandal, but this has diminishing returns, and although there 
may be group benefits to a larger audit committee, this influence is limited if the base 
requirements are met. It may also be that size has indirect benefits such as with growth could 
 
12 Other factors used to determine independence are: not an employee in the last 5 years, no business 
relationship in the last 3 years, has not received performance related pay, no family ties, and has not served on 
the board for over 9 years from their first appointment. 




come greater variety of skills and gender, as well as more independent or non-independent 
members.  
4.2.7 Audit committee activity 
The first significant variable of this study is audit committee activity which through the number 
of audit committee meeting frequency (H9) was found to have a significant and positive 
relationship with the likelihood of corporate scandal at the 10% level, therefore H9 is accepted. 
This result suggests that companies who are having, or on the verge, of corporate scandal – 
either currently or in the previous year - have a higher frequency of audit committee meetings. 
A reason for this could be that the companies recognise the problems and are meeting more in 
an attempt to address the issues that are leading to the scandal. This is consistent with the 
findings of Sharma and Iselin (2012) who find a significant relationship between meeting 
frequency and financial misstatement. However, there is consistent evidence to suggest 
meeting frequency reduces the likelihood of financial fraud by Abbott et al. (2000), Farber 
(2005), and Owens-Jackson et al. (2009). This could be a paradox in that both may be true. For 
example, some companies may meet more to try and be more effective since this could be 
viewed as a sign of diligence whereas other companies meet more because of problems, 
therefore depending on the sample both these conflicting arguments could be true at the same 
time. Another reason for the differences in results is the different regulatory requirements over 
the time periods. Abbott et al. (2000) and Farber (2005) are both pre-SOX where there was no 
requirement for meetings, Farber (2005) average meeting frequency for both fraud and no-
fraud firms were under 2 meetings. For the latter study, SOX requires by law that audit 
committees now meet at least 4 times per year compared to the UK Corporate Governance 
Codes of 2014 and 2018 recommendations of a minimum of 3 meetings. This enforcement of 
4 naturally leads to greater meetings in general and encourages meeting more than a lower 




4.5 times, in an attempt to follow best practice and legitimise themselves when there were 
issues so it is worth considering that an increase in the recommendation would result in similar 
patterns. On this same point of legitimacy, the maximum number of meetings for AEP firms 
was 9 times which raises questions on the content of the meetings. It is highly possible that 
many of these meetings lacked substance and were purely ceremonial; unfortunately, the length 
and content of such meeting is not public knowledge.  
The second part to activity is the attendance at the audit committee meetings (H10). This was 
found to be insignificant, which is likely due to both samples on average having significantly 
high attendance (>94%) at the meetings. Therefore H10 is rejected. It comes as no surprise 
though that the attendance of meetings had a negative coefficient as, without high attendance, 
it would be difficult to consider the viewpoints of all members. The result of this paper by no 
means suggests that meeting more has a direct causation effect on the likelihood of corporate 
scandal, only that it has a significant association. Therefore it is recommended that the UK 
Corporate Governance Code follows SOX and increases the recommendation to 4 meetings 
per year, as if companies meet more and are more diligent in the first place there may not be a 
requirement to meet more as issues relating to scandal arise since they will not exist.  
4.2.8 Audit committee other directorships 
There is currently no guidance in the UK Corporate Governance Code 2018 around the 
maximum number of other directorships that any one member may hold, only that the role can 
be time-consuming and that members should be aware of this when accepting a role. The 
average number of outside directorships (H11) was found to be insignificant on the likelihood 
of corporate scandal. This result suggests that if some members have extra directorships, they 
are either doing so within their limits, so their time is not being spread too thinly, or other audit 
committee members are doing enough in their place to avoid negative consequences. This is 




significance in a similar study. Krishnan (2005) also supports this as they found no significance 
between additional directorships and internal control problems, which in many instances leads 
to situations of corporate scandal. It was expected that other directorships would either 
positively impact the committee as the member would bring experience from other committees 
which could help solve difficult challenges, or it would negatively impact the time by 
consuming too much of the members’ time. The coefficient for other directorships was 
subsequently positive and although insignificant this is weak evidence to suggest too many 
other directorships could be damaging. The average number of directorships in this sample was 
2.4, but some members had as many as five, which could reasonably be expected to be 
demanding.  
Interestingly many other studies find additional directorships to be significant across some 
related factors. Sharma and Iselin (2012) found a positive association between additional 
directorships and financial misstatements, while Garven (2015) and Sun et al. (2014) link 
additional directorships to earnings management. On the flip side, Bedard et al. (2004) and 
Yang and Krishnan (2005) found a negative relationship between additional directors and 
earnings management. This is another area where there is inconsistent evidence in results, 
which may come from the variation in hours spent on each committee, for instance, it was 
shown in section 2.7 that audit committee members spent anywhere between less than 50 hours 
to over 150 on the committee. Therefore, at one extreme a member could have five other 
directorships but spend up 250 hours across them all. In contrast, at the other extreme, a 
member could have two other directorships that require over 400 hours of commitment. 
However, based on this study other directorships do not seem to be significantly associated 
with FRC investigations and therefore calls to implement any restrictions on the number of 




4.2.9 Big 4 auditor 
One of the control variables that turned out to be significant at the 10% level with a p-value of 
0.062 was the impact of the big 4. This was also found to be significant by Farber (2005), while 
Owens-Jackson et al. (2009) provided weak evidence of this in similar studies. This comes as 
no surprise since larger audit firms are argued to give higher quality audits (Astami et al., 2017; 
BenYoussef & Drira, 2020; Bhuiyan & D’Costa, 2020; Chan et al., 2020; Elamer, 2018b, 
2018a; El-Dyasty & Elamer, 2021; Eshleman and Guo, 2014; Gerged et al., 2020; Ji et al., 
2015; Nuskiya et al., 2021; Owusu et al., 2020; Zeng et al., 2020). Further to this, Sundgren 
and Svanstrom (2013) argue smaller audit firms receive more sanctions due to poorer audit 
quality which coincides with the results above. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
4.3 Endogeneity 
Our results so far suggest that the characteristics of an audit committee might mitigate the 
likelihood of corporate fraud/scandal/sanctions. Though, our main variable in this paper may 
be suffering from endogeneity. To handle this issue and self-selection bias (Abdelfattah et al., 
2020), we apply the two-stage Heckman model (Heckman, 1979). We employ a probit 
regression model in the first stage of the two-stage Heckman model, where we use ownership 
concentration and board of directors’ size as instruments to estimate the impact of self-selection 
bias on the choice of females. The dependent variable, the female audit committee chair, is a 
dummy variable.  We then calculated the inverse Mills ratio (λ) from the first stage that will 
measure the consequences of the self-selection bias. In the second stage, we use the fitted value 
of the female audit committee chair from the first stage. 
Table 4 presents the results of the Heckman model. The results are similar to those considered 




selection bias. After considering potential endogeneity, the characteristics of an audit 
committee still mitigate the likelihood of corporate fraud/scandal/sanctions These results show 
that our main results are robust. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper set out to analyse and understand the association between audit committee 
characteristics and the likelihood of corporate scandal, as defined by FRC investigation.  
Results based on the logit regression suggest that audit member tenure and audit committee 
meeting frequency both have positive associations to corporate scandal. It is suggested that at 
longer tenure lengths, audit committee members begin to lose their independence and their 
value has diminishing returns in the rapidly evolving business landscape. It is also suggested 
audit committees are more reactive than proactive to issues and may meet more frequently in 
an attempt to legitimise themselves. Other variables generally had the expected direction even 
if not significant. It was interesting that neither accountancy qualifications nor female 
representation had a significant influence; however, these variables did highlight the under-
representation of both on audit committees.  
These results should help regulatory policymakers make decisions which could be crucial to 
future corporate governance. Additionally, these results should be useful to investors who use 
corporate governance as criteria for investment decisions. It is recommended that the next UK 
regulator, which will likely be accompanied with a new code, should consider increasing the 
minimum requirement of yearly audit committee meetings to help mitigate the need for reactive 
meetings. It is also recommended that there should be consistent with what is deemed 
independent for one party and what is deemed independent for another. A final 
recommendation is that future versions of the UK Corporate Governance Code should continue 
to encourage diversity. These changes are incredibly important as high-profile corporate 




brings into question the integrity and objectivity of both the accounting profession and the audit 
committee. 
This paper had the following limitations. The first limitation is the small sample size, although 
where possible all available companies were used. This small sample was due to the availability 
of information. The FRC has been generally lenient with investigations which were shown 
from the two example papers that had similar parameters in the UK. The second limitation is 
in terms of audit committee meetings, as each company’s individual meeting process is not 
publicly available. Ideally, it would have been insightful to understand the length and content 
of each meeting for a deeper understanding. The final limitation is the variety of variables used 
for each characteristic. Outstandingly, this paper would have looked at several other proxies 
for independence, such as family ties, as well as other proxies for financial expertise, such as 
governance expertise. Looking at any scope for future study, as the regulatory landscape is 
constantly changing, there will be new areas that require insight. For instance, the recent block 
on non-audit services by audit firms offer scope and opportunity to analyse the level of non-
audit service fees against audit committee characteristics. It may also be worth looking at all 
four US categories of financial expert in a UK context. A final recommendation for future study 
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Table 1: Variables description 
Name Abbreviation Description 
Dependent Variable 
Scandal  Scandal  1 = AEP company. 0 = Otherwise 
Independent Variables 
Female Chair  ACFC Percentage of chairpersons that were female. 
Female audit 
committee 
ACF Percentage of audit committee members that were female. 
Qualified 
Accountant  
ACQ Percentage of audit committee members that held a Chartered 
Accountancy qualification. 
No. of AC 
meetings 
ACM Average number of audit committee meetings held in one 
financial year. 
AC attendance % ACA Average attendance percentage at the audit committee meetings 
in one financial year. 
No. of shares 
held %  
ACS Average shareholding percentage of audit committee members. 
Other 
Directorships 
ACD Average number of outside directorships held by audit committee 
members. 
Audit experience  ACE Percentage of audit committee members who were former 
auditors. 
AC Size ACSZ Average size of the audit committee. 
AC 
Remuneration 
ACR Average compensation paid to audit committee members for 
their services. 
AC Tenure ACT Average tenure of members of the audit committee members. 
  Control Variables 





Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables 
Full Sample AEP Firms Non-AEP Firms 
Mean STD Min Max Mean STD Min Max Mean STD Min Max 
ACFC 0.197 0.401 0.000 1.000 0.182 0.395 0.000 1.000 0.205 0.408 0.000 1.000 
ACF 0.307 0.192 0.000 0.750 0.254 0.225 0.000 0.750 0.334 0.170 0.000 0.750 
ACQ 0.291 0.173 0.000 0.670 0.246 0.162 0.000 0.500 0.313 0.176 0.000 0.667 
ACM 4.210 1.390 1.000 9.000 4.500 1.626 3.000 9.000 4.068 1.246 1.000 7.000 
ACA 0.960 0.078 0.670 1.000 0.977 0.049 0.800 1.000 0.945 0.088 0.667 1.000 
ACS 0.398 2.230 0.000 12.940 1.184 3.805 0.000 12.942 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.036 
ACD 2.412 1.040 0.500 5.000 2.728 0.667 1.500 3.800 2.254 1.158 0.500 5.000 
BIG4 0.849 0.361 0.000 1.000 0.636 0.492 0.000 1.000 0.955 0.211 0.000 1.000 
ACE 0.160 0.169 0.000 0.500 0.164 0.186 0.000 0.500 0.158 0.163 0.000 0.500 
ACSZ 4.091 1.049 2.000 7.000 3.955 0.950 2.000 5.000 4.159 1.098 2.000 7.000 
ACR 57859.03 24050.20 7245 133200 61194.39 21433.44 36666.67 132000 56191.35 25326.91 7245 133200 
ACT 4.431 2.042 0.500 11.333 5.708 2.256 3.000 11.333 3.793 1.601 0.500 7.750 
Notes: This table is a breakdown of the key statistics relevant to the data set. AC chair female (ACFC), female audit committee (ACF), qualified accountant (ACQ), audit committee attendance 
(ACA), number of shares held (ACS), external auditor (BIG4), and audit experience (ACE). Number of audit committee meetings (ACM), other directorships (ACD), audit committee size (ACS), 





Table 3: Correlation matrix 
 
Notes: This table illustrates the correlation which exists between all regressors utilised throughout this study. AC chair female (ACFC), female audit committee (ACF), qualified accountant (ACQ), 
audit committee attendance (ACA), number of shares held (ACS), external auditor (BIG4), and audit experience (ACE). Number of audit committee meetings (ACM), other directorships (ACD), 




Variables ACFC ACF ACQ ACM ACA ACS ACD BIG4 ACE ACSZ ACR ACT 
ACFC 1            
ACF 0.365 1           
ACQ 0.141 0.063 1          
ACM 0.007 0.135 -0.103 1         
ACA 0.007 -0.029 0.031 0.069 1        
ACS -0.089 -0.286 0.043 -0.156 0.102 1       
ACD 0.008 0.068 -0.05 0.278 0.203 0.102 1      
BIG4 -0.216 0.112 0.035 0.127 -0.062 -0.420 -0.068 1     
ACE 0.069 -0.066 0.620 0.019 0.063 0.181 -0.124 0.084 1    
ACSZ -0.08 0.245 -0.041 0.156 0.061 -0.186 0.068 0.321 -0.020 1   
ACR -0.101 0.093 -0.044 0.680 0.119 -0.072 0.442 0.220 0.055 0.163 1  




Table 4: Regression Result 
Variables Logistic Binary Model Two Stage Heckman Model 
Coef. Std. Err. z P value Coef. Std. Err. z P value 
ACFC -0.36 1.15 -0.32 0.75 -1.88 1.53 -1.23 0.22 
ACF -0.59 2.51 -0.23 0.82 -14.02 5.75 -2.44 0.02** 
ACQ -3.17 3.40 -0.93 0.35 8.16 5.48 1.49 0.14 
ACM 0.69 0.41 1.68 0.093 * 0.34 0.70 -1.69 0.09* 
ACA -0.18 5.59 -0.03 0.97 -9.61 5.69 0.49 0.62 
ACS 34.12 74.23 0.46 0.65 -160.95 147.78 -1.09 0.28 
ACD 0.38 0.44 0.86 0.39 -2.30 1.11 -0.17 0.86 
BIG4 -4.15 2.22 -1.87 0.062 * -18.73 2.61 -7.17 0.00*** 
ACE 3.84 3.85 1.00 0.32 -13.57 7.95 -1.71 0.09* 
ACSZ 0.22 0.41 0.53 0.59 0.91 0.60 1.51 0.13 
ACR 0.00 0.00 -0.80 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.38 
ACT 0.66 0.29 2.30 0.021 ** -0.07 0.40 -2.07 0.04** 
Constant -3.16 5.26 -0.60 0.55 - - - - 
λ - - - - -1.87 0.80 -2.34 0.02** 
Note: *, ** and *** are used to show which variables are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. AC chair female 
(ACFC), female audit committee (ACF), qualified accountant (ACQ), audit committee attendance (ACA), number of shares 
held (ACS), external auditor (BIG4), and audit experience (ACE). Number of audit committee meetings (ACM), other 










Appendix 1 – AEP and Non-AEP firms 
AEP firms Non-AEP comparable 1 Non-AEP comparable 2 
1. Sports Direct 
International 
1. JD Sports Fashion 1. NEXT 
2. Rolls-Royce Holdings 2. BAE Systems  2. Senior  
3. BT Group 3. Vodafone Group 3. Computacenter 
4. Mitie Group  4. Rentokil Initial  4. Babcock 
International Group 
5. Carillion 5. Morgan Sindall Group 5. Galliford Try 
6. SIG 6. Travis Perkins 6. Grafton Group plc  
7. Patisserie Holdings 7. Hotel Chocolat Group 7. Greggs 
8. Interserve 8. Serco Group 8. Morgan Sindall 
Group 
9. Thomas Cook Group 9. InterContinental Hotels 
Group 
9. Air Partner 
10. Laura Ashley Holdings 10. Mothercare 10. N Brown Group 
11. Ted Baker 11. Superdry  11. N Brown Group  













Appendix 2 – Glossary of disclosures 
Author Disclosure type Description 
Kelton and 
Yang (2008) 
Internet Financial Reporting Publicly available online disclosures 
in both report and presentation format. 
Li et al (2012) Intellectual Capital Disclosure Comprises of three major components: 




Interim Disclosure The level of disclosure in interim 
reports. 
Persons (2009)  Earlier Voluntary Ethics 
Disclosure  
A combination of a written code of 
business conduct and an ethics 
committee separate to the board who 
had an officer. All of which had to be 
disclosed before 15th July in the paper 
to meet the criteria of early. 
 
